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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions
within orthodox Quantum Mechanics (QM) and their relation to physi-
cal reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppo-
sitions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not
only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present
Orthodox Line of Research (OLR), but also how these desiderata im-
plicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation
of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how most
interpretations of QM argue against the existence of superpositions.
Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to re-
cover a classical representation about “what there is”, and secondly,
we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths
who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to “get rid
of the ghost of Schro¨dinger’s cat”. Contrary to the OLR, we will argue
—based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS)—
that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to
the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not
only the key to the most important —present and future— technologi-
cal and experimental developments in quantum information processing
but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of
QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We
∗Fellow Researcher of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas y Te´cnicas.
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will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist
development must be the abandonment of the (dogmatic) idea that
‘Actuality = Reality’.
Keywords: quantum superposition, physical reality, measurement problem.
When the layman says ‘reality’ he usually thinks
that he is speaking about something which is self-evidently known;
while to me it appears to be specifically
the most important and extremely difficult task of our time
to work on the elaboration of a new idea of reality.
Wolfgang Pauli
Introduction
Quantum superpositions are being used today in laboratories all around the
world in order to develop the most outstanding technological and experi-
mental developments of the last centuries. Indeed, quantum computation,
quantum teleportation, quantum cryptography and the like technologies are
opening an amazing range of possibilities for the near future. As it is well
known, this new quantum technological era is based and founded on one of
the main principles of Quantum Mechanics (QM), the so called superposi-
tion principle—which in turn gives rise to quantum superpositions and en-
tanglement. But while many experimentalists state that Schro¨dinger’s cats
are getting “fatter” and “bigger”, while it becomes more and more clear that
there is something real about these quantum superpositions, philosophers of
QM in charge of analyzing and interpreting these mathematical expressions
(through the many interpretations of QM that can be found in the litera-
ture) coincide almost exclusively —even though for very different reasons—
that quantum superpositions do not exist! It is indeed true that quantum
superpositions do not seem to match our picture of “classical reality”; but
even for those who seem to accept —like Dieks and Griffiths— that QM is
not talking about “classical reality”, there is a strange need of getting “rid of
the ghost of Schro¨dinger’s cat” at any cost. But why? Why is it so difficult
to come up with a coherent interpretation of quantum superpositions that
relates them to physical reality instead of mere measurement outcomes? We
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will argue in this paper that one of the main reasons is related to the role
played by a deeply rooted metaphysical equation which states that: ‘Actual-
ity = Reality’. We will argue that if we are willing to discuss the possibility
that “Quantum Physical Reality 6= Actuality’, then there is plenty of space
to interpret and represent quantum superpositions in terms of (non-actual)
physical reality. The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we discuss
what should be considered as a representational realist stance about physics
which, going against “naive realism”, accepts as a standpoint the theory-
ladenness of physical experience. Section 2 provides an analysis of the meta-
physical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the possible interpretations of
QM. In section 3, we discuss how such metaphysical presuppositions have
become unquestionable dogmas which guide the Orthodox Line of Research
(OLR), more specifically we analyze how two of the main problems in the
foundational literature about QM, namely, the ‘measurement’ and ‘basis’
problems, focus only on the justification of the classical representation of
physics. Section 4 provides a definition of MPS within a theory and dis-
cusses the need to consider Counterfactual Reasoning (CR) as a necessary
condition for providing a coherent physical discourse and representation of
reality. In section 5 we analyze and discuss, firstly, those interpretations
that deny the existence of quantum superpositions “right from the start” by
claiming that QM should be represented —even changing the formalism—
in terms of “classical reality”, and secondly, we will focus on those inter-
pretations which even though agree that QM does not talk about “classical
reality”, still deny that quantum superpositions are related to physical re-
ality. In particular, we will concentrate on Dieks’ and Griffiths’ arguments
against the existence of quantum superpositions. In section 6, we remark
—given that physics is an experimental science— the relation of quantum
superpositions to present experimental and technological developments in
quantum information processing that are taking place today in the lab. In
section 7, we continue providing a series of arguments in favor of considering
quantum superpositions as real physical existents. We also stress the need
of leaving aside the classical metaphysical presupposition that ‘Actuality =
Reality’. In the final section we give the conclusions of the paper.
1 The Representational Realist Stance
Physics has been always connected to different philosophical stances, but
certainly, realism is one of the main viewpoints within the history of physics.
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The main presupposition of realism with respect to physics is that physical
theories talk about reality. According to our representational realist stance
[19, 20], which will be presupposed through the rest of the paper, the funda-
ment of any physical theory is physical representation and not experimental
data —the latter should be regarded by a representational realist only as
part of the confirmation (or failure) of the empirical adequacy of a theory.
Indeed, the representational realist takes as a standpoint the existence of
Nature adding to it the idea that such existence can be represented through
the interrelation of mathematical formalisms and conceptual networks allow-
ing us to predict and understand specific phenomena. This realist stance,
which relates to Heisenberg’s closed theory approach [10], goes against any
type of naive realism that denies the theory ladenness of physical experi-
ence. Against the idea that one could distinguish between phenomena and
raw observable data we have argued in [20] that even a ‘click’ in a detec-
tor or a ‘spot’ in a cloud chamber are only determined through the logical
and ontological principles of existence, non-contradiction and identity. Such
principles are not something that we find out in the world but rather meta-
physical presuppositions that shape even our most basic experience. We
have argued that even ‘clicks’ and ‘spots’ found in a laboratory are theory
laden. Any stance going against representational realism must be capable
of producing arguments that explain how physical experience can account
for phenomena without the need of presupposing a physical representation.
Physical representation allows us to think about experience and predict
phenomena without the need of actually performing any experiment. This
is of course a completely different standpoint from those of many empiri-
cist approaches who argue instead that the fundament of physics is ‘actual
experimental data’. For example, as remarked by van Fraassen [48, pp. 202-
203]: “To develop an empiricist account of science is to depict it as involving
a search for truth only about the empirical world, about what is actual and
observable.” Even though there are different positions with respect to the
consideration of what accounts to be an empirically adequate theory (see
e.g. [8, p. 351]) we would like to draw a line distinguishing between those
stances that accept the theory ladenness of physical experience and those
which deny it. Our analysis is only concerned with the former.1
1We acknowledge however that the theory ladenness of physical experience is still today
controversial within philosophy of science. As remarked by Bogen and Woodward [8, p.
304]: “The positivist picture of the structure of scientific theories is now widely rejected.
But the underlying idea that scientific theories are primarily designed to predict and
explain claims about what we observe remains enormously influential, even among the
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Following van Fraassen [49, p. xviii], we have called the attention to
the importance of making explicit the metaphysical stance that one takes in
order to analyze a specific problem [19, 20]. In this respect we would like to
make clear right from the start what should be considered to be the kernel
of a representational realist account of physics:
Representational Realism about Physical Theories (RRPT): A rep-
resentational realist account of a physical theory must be capable of providing
a physical representation of reality in terms of a network of concepts which
relates to the mathematical formalism of the theory and allows to make pre-
dictions of definite phenomena.
Contrary to our definition of realism in physics which considers representa-
tion as a main construct of physical theories, naive realism claims instead
that physical observation provides direct access to reality as it is. This idea
was already implicit in the logical positivist distinction between theoretical
terms and empirical terms. But even though in the philosophy of science
community this distinction is characterized as “naive”, many of the prob-
lems discussed in the literature still presuppose implicitly such distinction.
Indeed, as remarked by Curd and Cover [14, p. 1228]: “Logical positivism
is dead and logical empiricism is no longer an avowed school of philosophical
thought. But despite our historical and philosophical distance from logical
positivism and empiricism, their influence can be felt. An important part of
their legacy is observational-theoretical distinction itself, which continues to
play a central role in debates about scientific realism.” We have argued that
the naive realist stance is not only philosophically untenable but maybe even
more importantly, closes the door to a fundamental development of physics
—since such stance assumes we already know what reality is in terms of
(naive) observation.
From a realist perspective, physics attempts to describe a world in which
we humans have no special preeminence with respect to existence. In this
respect, the description or representation provided by classical physics was
clearly specified since Newton’s mechanics in terms of systems constituted
by definite valued properties; i.e., in general terms, what is called an Actual
State of Affairs (ASA).2 Also from a realist viewpoint, measurement and
observation have been always considered as a way of exposing or discovering
sharpest critics of positivism.”
2See for discussion and definition of this notion in the context of classical physics [25].
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such preexistent ASA. But, as we know —contrary to classical physics— QM
places serious difficulties for such a realist representation. An evidence of the
deep crisis of physical representation within the theory of the quanta is the
fact that more than one century after its creation the physics community has
reached no consensus about what the theory is talking about. Indeed, for
many a consistent interpretation that would match this strange formalism to
a physical representation of reality seems to difficult to be found, for others
it is enough for QM to account for the correct measurement outcomes.
Of course, when discussing about QM and its interpretation there are
multiple standpoints and interpretative strategies that one can assume. For
example, one can argue —as it has been done already by Fuchs and Peres
[36, p. 70]— that “[...] quantum theory does not describe physical real-
ity. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for
the macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of ex-
perimental interventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum
theory is the only interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or
theorists.” This instrumentalist perspective is satisfied with having an algo-
rithmic recipe that allows us to calculate measurement outcomes from the
formalism. But this is certainly not enough for a representational realist, for
whom the formalism should be capable of relating coherently an interpreta-
tion which allows to provide a physical representation of reality according
to the theory [20]. In contrast, within a representational realist approach
to QM there are two main possibilities. The first one is to argue that QM
makes reference to the same physical representation provided by classical
physics; i.e. that it talks about an ASA. This is, for example, the main idea
presupposed by the Hidden Variable Program (HVP) which, as noticed by
Bacciagaluppi [6, p. 74], attempts to “restore a classical way of thinking
about what there is.” The second possibility is to consider that QM might
describe physical reality in a different, maybe even incommensurable, way to
that of classical physics. This possibility seems to be endorsed by Griffiths
[39, p. 174] who argues that many of the problems with the interpretation
of QM come from “the view that the real world is classical, contrary to all
we have learned from the development of quantum mechanics in the twenti-
eth century.” However, this second possibility, of developing a non-classical
representation of physical reality has not in our opinion been thoroughly
investigated. The reason is that the metaphysical presuppositions imposed
by Bohr to the OLR implicitly take as a standpoint the idea that ‘Actuality
= Reality’ denying the possibility of a non-classical realm of reality.
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2 Niels Bohr’s Creation of Orthodox Dogmas
In [21, 22], we have argued extensively that Bohr is the main responsible for
producing an epistemological interpretation of QM that does not only limit
physical representation in terms of classical language and classical phenom-
ena but also precludes the very possibility of introducing and developing
new (non-classical) concepts. This was done by Bohr through the intro-
duction of two main desiderata which will be discussed in the following.
Unfortunately, since the mid 20th century the OLR took these desiderata as
necessary standpoints to think about the interpretation of QM. Accepted as
unquestionable, these metaphysical presuppositions were turned into dog-
mas that any interpretation of QM had to respect.
The first metaphysical presupposition is the idea that there must ex-
ist a “quantum to classical limit”, implying what Bokulich calls an “open
theory approach” [10]. This idea was put forward by Bohr in terms of his
correspondence principle [11].
1. Quantum to Classical Limit: The principle that one must find a
“bridge” or “limit” between classical mechanics and QM.
The second metaphysical principle which has guided the OLR can be also
traced back to Bohr’s claim that physical experience needs to be expressed
exclusively in terms of classical physical language [12]. Bohr [50, p. 7]
stated that: “[...] the unambiguous interpretation of any measurement must
be essentially framed in terms of classical physical theories, and we may
say that in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the
language of physicists for all time.” In this respect [Op. cit., p. 7], “it would
be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may
be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new
conceptual forms.”
2. Classical Representation of Physics: The principle that one needs
to presuppose the classical representation of physics in order to discuss
about phenomena and interpret QM.
Both principles go clearly against a radical non-classical understanding of
QM. A direct consequence of such commitment against new non-classical no-
tions has been the incoherent analysis of the double-slit experiment which,
described in terms of QM, cannot be understood as talking neither about
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‘waves’ nor ‘particles’. As a matter of fact we know quite well that Ψ can-
not be interpreted in terms of waves or particles for many reasons that
were collected since the early discussions of the founding fathers. Let us
shortly recall some of them. Firstly, Ψ is a mathematical entity that lives
in configuration space, not in classical 3-dimensional space —which in turn
would allow an interpretation in terms of the Newtonian physical notions of
space and time. Consequently, Ψ cannot represent a ‘particle’ nor a ‘wave’
which are physical notions that live in a classical 3-dimensional space. Sec-
ondly, according to the orthodox Born interpretation of Ψ, the quantum
wave function describes a probability distribution —something difficult to
imagine since the quantum probability is non-Kolmogorovian and thus can-
not be interpreted in terms of ignorance about an ASA [46]— and thus it
is neither a ‘wave’ nor a ‘particle’. Thirdly, the fact that the phenomena
is wave-like (or particle-like) does not necessarily imply that one is talking
about waves (or particles) for in a physical theory one also needs to be ca-
pable of relating the phenomena not only to physical notions but also to a
mathematical formalism which is coherent with such notions. Fourthly, a
‘click’ in a typical quantum experimental set up does not behave as if that
which is making the click is a ‘particle’ or a ‘wave’. Bell’s inequalities prove
explicitly that ‘quantum clicks’ cannot be represented in terms of a classical
local-realistic theory —to which ‘particles’ and ‘waves’ pertain. There are
well known experiments that have tested the weirdness of such non-classical
‘clicks’. Fifthly, the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem [44] proves that Ψ does
not possess definite valued properties, in contrast with the case of ‘waves’
and ‘particles’ which do possess definite valued properties. Finally, a recent
theorem has proven that Ψ cannot be represented in terms of dynamical
properties [26].
It is quite clear that the knowledge we have acquired of QM today is
more detailed and accurate than the one Bohr and Einstein had at the be-
ginning of the 20th-Century when they discussed the interpretation of QM
in terms of the wave-particle duality. With the knowledge we have today it
would also seem wise to recall the old logical positivist lesson that the use
of inappropriate notions within language can only create pseudoproblems.
Unfortunately, today, even within the specialized literature, it is extremely
common to read arguments which still use uncritically the notions of ‘wave’
and ‘particle’ in order to analyze the interpretation of QM. Those who speak
in this way, when confronted to some of the just mentioned arguments might
go down a different path and claim that: “This is just a way of speaking.
Everybody knows that ‘quantum particles’ are different of ‘classical parti-
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cles’.” Then of course the question of any interested interlocutor would be:
“But then, what is a quantum particle?” And then the answer is always very
conclusive: “Quantum particles are something really weird!”
3 The (Orthodox) ‘Measurement’ and ‘Basis’ Prob-
lems Revisited
As analyzed in [21] the OLR deals with a specific set of problems which ana-
lyze QM from a classical perspective. This means that all problems assume
as a standpoint a classical representation and only reflect on the formalism
in “negative terms”, that is, in terms of the failure of QM to account for the
classical representation of reality and its concepts: separability, space, time,
locality, individuality, identity, actuality, etc. The “negative” problems are
thus: non-separability, non-locality, non-individuality, non-identity, etc.3
These problems start their analysis from the notions of classical physics as-
suming implicitly as a standpoint the strong metaphysical presupposition
that QM should be able to represent physical reality according to such clas-
sical notions. But among the many problems that can be found in the
literature there are two unsolved main problems which show most explicitly
that accommodating QM within classical physics seems an impossible task.
The first problem relates directly to the issue of contextuality and is called
the “basis problem”:
Basis Problem (BP): Given the fact that Ψ can be expressed by multiple
incompatible bases —given by the choice of a Complete Set of Commuting
Observables (CSCO)— and that due to the KS theorem the observables aris-
ing from such bases cannot be interpreted as simultaneously preexistent, the
question is: how does Nature make a choice between the different bases?
Which is the objective physical process that leads to a particular basis in-
stead of a different one?
Once again, the BP is a way of discussing quantum contextuality in “neg-
ative terms”. The problem already sets the solution through the specificity
of its questioning. The problem presupposes that there is a path —in accor-
dance to the quantum to classical limit imposed by Bohr— from the weird
contextual quantum formalism to a classical noncontextual experimental set
3I am grateful to Bob Coecke for this linguistic insight.
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up in which classical discourse holds. If one could explain this path through
an objective physical process then the choice of the experimenter could be
regarded also as part of an objective process as well —and not one that
determines reality. Unfortunately, still today the problem remains with no
solution within the limits of the orthodox formalism. There is no physical
representation of the process without the explicit change of the formalism
of the theory or the addition of strange ad hoc rules; rules which not only
lack any physical justification but, more importantly, also degrade the MPS
of the theory (section 5).
A very different problem —sometimes also mixed and partly confused
with the BP— is the so called “measurement problem” which deals explicitly
with the superposition principle and takes as a standpoint a specific basis
or context.
Measurement Problem (MP): Given a specific basis (or CSCO) QM de-
scribes mathematically a state in terms of a superposition (of states), since
the evolution described by QM allows us to predict that the quantum system
will get entangled with the apparatus and thus its pointer positions will also
become a superposition,4 the question is why do we observe a single outcome
instead of a superposition of them?
The measurement problem is also a way of discussing the formalism in “neg-
ative terms” with respect to classical physics. In this case the problem
concentrates in the justification of measurement outcomes. It should be
remarked that the MP presupposes that the basis (or context) —directly
related to a measurement set up— has been already determined. Thus it
should be clear that there is no question regarding the contextual character
of the theory within this specific problem. But once the experimental ar-
rangement is settled —leaving aside the BP— a new problem appears: due
to the superposition principle one can find, within a context, that the state
is mathematically described in terms of the so called “quantum superposi-
tions” which are weird mathematical expressions composed by sets of states,
4Given a quantum system represented by a superposition
∑
ci|αi〉, when in contact
with an apparatus ready to measure, |R0〉, QM predicts that system and apparatus will
become “entangled” in such a way that the final ‘system + apparatus’ will be described
by
∑
ci|αi〉|Ri〉. Thus, as a consequence of the quantum evolution, the pointers have also
become —like the original quantum system— a superposition of pointers
∑
ci|Ri〉. This
is why the MP can be stated as a problem only in the case the original quantum state is
described by a superposition of more than one term.
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|αi〉, each of which gives rise to (compatible) projectors, |αi〉〈αi|, interpreted
as compatible observables (or properties). As we have discussed in [15] such
quantum superpositions can be, in general, composed of contradictory prop-
erties (section 7.3). Notice that given a Ψ we call a quantum superposition
to each different representation of the Ψ in a specific basis. Thus the Ψ
gives rise to different superpositions, each one of them determined within
a CSCO. This goes against the orthodox assumption that every superposi-
tion arising from Ψ is “the same” superposition irrespectively of the basis,
implying through this idea a reintroduction of contextuality within the MP.
This interpretation confuses the whole problem and changes the issue at
stake. We have extensively discussed this interpretational maneuver and
the meaning of quantum contextuality in [23].
In the MP the weirdness appears because a superposition can be com-
posed simultaneously by a specific property (e.g., the system has the prop-
erty ‘spin up in the x direction’) and its contradictory property (e.g., the
system has the property ‘spin down in the x direction’).5 On the one hand,
due to the seeming violation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC),
it makes no sense to interpret both properties as actual ones (see for discus-
sion [15]). This was cleverly exposed by Schro¨dinger in his 1935 gedanken-
experiment in which a cat, after interacting with an atom represented by a
quantum superposition, possessed at the same time the property of being
‘alive’ and the property of being ‘dead’ [47]. On the other hand, all terms in
the superposition must be considered in the evolution of the state and the
predictions that can be made from it. One could analyze what such weird
quantum superpositions represent in physical terms, instead the orthodox
literature —following Bohr— has limited the analysis through the MP to
the justification of actual measurement outcomes.
4 Meaningful Physical Statements and Counter-
factual Reasoning
In order to discuss and analyze physical interpretations of a theory one
should first agree on what should be considered as Meaningful Physical
Statements (MPS) within that theory. Furthermore, from a representational
realist perspective, the theory should be capable of representing physically
5There is an ongoing debate regarding the interpretation of such properties in terms
of ‘contradiction’ and ‘contrariety’. See: [2, 3, 4, 21].
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the MPS it talks about.6
Definition 4.1 Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS): If given a
specific situation a theory is capable of predicting in terms of definite phys-
ical statements the outcomes of possible measurements, then such physical
statements are meaningful relative to the theory and must be constitutive
parts of the particular representation of physical reality that the theory pro-
vides. Measurement outcomes must be considered only as an exposure of the
empirical adequacy (or not) of the theory.
It must be remarked that a MPS pertains to the physical representation
provided by the particular theory, this means we leave open —going against
Bohr’s second desiderata— the possibility that experience is not reduced to
actual measurement outcomes. It should be also noticed that this definition
of MPS should be only followed by those who attempt to provide an objec-
tive description of physical reality in representational realist terms. Because
MPS pertain to physical representation, from a representational realist ac-
count of physics, MPS are necessarily related to counterfactual reasoning.
Definition 4.2 Counterfactual Reasoning (CR): The possibility to make
MPS in terms of a physical representation allows in general for counterfac-
tual statements in physical discourse. If the theory is empirically adequate
then such MPS are taken to be that of which the theory talks about. MPS
are not necessarily statements about future events, they can be also state-
ments about past and present events. CR about MPS comprise all actual
and non-actual physical experience.
If we accept the RRPT stance (section 1), physical representation must
take into account the MPS produced by the theory. This also implies that
CR is a necessary condition that a theory must uphold for without it there is
no possibility of physical representation nor physical discourse. Without CR
in physical discourse one cannot imagine experience beyond actuality. For a
representational realist, the power of physics is CR itself, it is the capability
that allows us to predict that “if I perform this or that experiment” then
—if it is a MPS— the physical theory will tell me that “the outcome will be
x or y”, and I do not need to actually perform the experiment! I know what
the result will be independently of actually performing the experiment or
6This is of course not the case for those philosophical positions that take actual obser-
vation as their fundament. See for discussion: [20].
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not.7 That is the whole point of being a realist about physics, that I trust
the theory to be talking about a physical representation of reality. CR in
physical discourse has nothing to do with time, evolution nor dynamics, it
has to do with the possibility of representing experience. A physical theory
allows me to make claims about the future, the present and the past, just in
the same way physical invariance in classical mechanics connects the multi-
ple frames of reference without me being in any particular one. CR is the
discursive invariance with respect to physical phenomena. We do not need
to be in a specific frame to know what will happen in that specific frame or
a different one. Notice, once again, that CR is a necessary condition only
for representational realist approaches, not for those philosophical positions
which denying the theory ladenness of physical experience are grounded on
raw experimental data.
Remark: CR is a necessary condition for a coherent discourse about MPS
that pertain to a particular physical representation —consequently, also for
supporting RRPT.
5 Getting Rid of the Ghost of Schro¨dinger’s Cat
“Getting rid of the ghost of Schrodinger’s cat” is a phrase used by Griffiths
[39] which we find very appropriate to describe the orthodox perspective
towards quantum superpositions in the foundational literature. The general
uncomfortable feeling with respect to superpositions is always stressed by
adjectives like “embarrassing”, “weird”, “strange”, “spooky”, etc. which
always accompany their definition. The truth is that Schro¨dinger’s cat is
indeed a strange kind of zombie-cat dead and alive at the same time. A
creature difficult to picture or imagine. This might be the reason why most
interpretations have attempted, either to get rid of what they consider to
be a “ghost” or simply argue that in “classical reality” ghosts do not exist.
The scope of this paper is not to discuss the many interpretations of QM
but rather to analyze their specific viewpoint regarding quantum superpo-
sitions. In this respect, we can separate the many interpretations of QM in
two main groups according to such understanding. In the first subsection we
7The fact that what we know in QM is given in statistical terms does not imply that
we need to explain such predictions in classical terms. Or that knowledge boils down only
to ‘knowledge that accounts for certainty about actuality’. In the case of QM we have a
new kind of ‘certain knowledge in statistical terms’.
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consider a group of interpretations which avoid discussing about quantum
superpositions “right from the start” by arguing that QM must be described
in terms of “classical reality”. In the second subsection, we concentrate on
a different group which even though (more or less) agrees that QM does not
need to be represented in classical terms still argues against the existence of
quantum superpositions. Among the many interpretations that follow this
second path in this occasion we concentrate in Dieks’ modal interpretation
and in Griffiths’ Consistent Histories (CH) interpretation. According to our
analysis, Dieks and Griffiths, although take as a standpoint a realist stance
with respect to the interpretation of QM, instead of discussing the possible
physical representations of quantum superpositions end up trying to justify
measurement outcomes in an instrumentalist fashion. Let us explain this in
detail.
5.1 Recovering “Classical Reality”
As we have argued in [18] one of the main lines of research —following the
so called Hidden Variable Program (HVP)— attempts to “restore a classical
way of thinking about what there is” [6, p. 74] through a reconsideration
or extension of the formalism. The best known hidden variable theory is
due to Bohm’s proposal which seems to restore the possibility of discussing
in terms of a ASA. In Bohmian mechanics the state of a system is given
by the wave function ψ together with the configuration of particles X. The
quantum wave function must be understood in analogy to a classical field
that moves the particles in accordance with the following functional relation:
dx
dt
= ∇S, where S = ~δ (δ being the phase of ψ). Thus, particles always
have a well defined position together with the rest of their properties and
the evolution depends on the quantum field. It then follows that, there are
no superpositions of states, the superposition is given only at the level of the
field and remains as mysterious as the superposition of classical fields. Given
a quantum field ϕ(x) the particle will move according to it. If we change the
quantum field by adding another filed φ(x) such that the new quantum field
is now the superposition: ϕ(x) + φ(x), there is no ontological peculiarity
involved for now the particle also has a well defined position and will evolve
according to the new field. Presumably, due to the fact that the new field
is different from the original one the particle will move in a different way
and will follow a different trajectory compared to the first case. The field
does not only have a dynamical character but also determines the epistemic
probability of the configuration of particles via the usual Born rule.
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Apart from the HVP we can also find in the literature the Dynamical
Reduction Program (DRP) which, according to Ghirardi [37], “consists in ac-
cepting that the dynamical equation of the standard theory should be mod-
ified by the addition of stochastic and nonlinear terms.” The most famous
of these attempts is the Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber proposal (also called
‘GRW theory’) [38] which introduces non-linear terms in the Schro¨dinger
equation. The introduction of such non-linear terms attempts to explain
the projection postulate and the MP. However, as Ghirardi [37] acknowl-
edges, “the problem of building satisfactory relativistic generalizations of
these models has encountered serious mathematical difficulties due to the
appearance of intractable divergences.” As he makes the point:
“the validity of the superposition principle and the related phenomenon
of entanglement [...] have embarrassing consequences since they imply
[...] the non-epistemic nature of quantum probabilities, the objective
indefiniteness of physical properties and the objective entanglement
between spatially separated and non-interacting constituents of a com-
posite system.[...] If one wishes to have an acceptable final situation,
one mirroring the fact that we have definite perceptions, one is arguably
compelled to break the linearity of the theory at an appropriate stage.
[The GRW theory] allows one to understand how one can choose the
parameters in such a way that the quantum predictions for microscopic
systems remain fully valid while the embarrassing macroscopic super-
positions in measurement-like situations are suppressed in very short
times.” [Op. cit.]
A different proposal is that of Many Worlds (MW) interpretation, con-
sidered to be a direct conclusion from Everett’s first proposal in terms of
‘relative states’ [34]. Staying away from the HVP, Everett’s idea was to let
QM find its own interpretation, making justice to the symmetries inherent
in the Hilbert space formalism in a simple and convincing way [27]. Con-
trary to the DRP, MW interpretations are no-collapse interpretations which
respect the orthodox formulation of QM. The main idea behind this inter-
pretation is that superpositions relate to collections of worlds, in each of
which exactly one value of an observable, which corresponds to one of the
terms in the superposition, is realized. Apart from being simple, the claim
is that it possesses a natural fit to the formalism, respecting its symmetries.
The solution proposed by MW to the measurement problem is provided by
assuming that each one of the terms in the superposition is actual in its
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own correspondent world. According to Everett [35, p. 146] himself: “The
whole issue of the transition from ‘possible’ to ‘actual’ is taken care of in the
theory in a very simple way —there is no such transition, nor is such a tran-
sition necessary for the theory to be in accord with our experience. From
the viewpoint of the theory all elements of a superposition (all ‘branches’)
are ‘actual’, none any more ‘real’ than the rest.” Thus, it is not only the
single value which we see in ‘our world’ which gets actualized but rather,
that a branching of worlds takes place in every measurement, giving rise to
a multiplicity of actual worlds with their corresponding actual values. The
possible splits of the worlds are determined by the laws of QM but each
world becomes again “classical”. Quantum superpositions are interpreted
as expressing the existence of multiple worlds, each of which exists in (its
own) actuality. However, there are no superpositions in this, our actual
world, for each world becomes again a “classical world”. The MW interpre-
tation seems to be able to recover these islands of classicality at the price of
multiplying the ‘actual realm’. In this case, the quantum superposition is
expelled from each actual world and recovered only in terms of the relation
between the multiple worlds.
5.2 Physical Representation or Measurement Outcomes?
In this section we concentrate in the arguments provided by Dieks and Grif-
fiths against the existence of quantum superpositions and show how both
approaches, going against their original realist stance, end up considering
measurement outcomes as the very fundament of their own interpretations.
First of all we should remark that we agree with Dieks [28, p. 189]
when he argues that: “It is the state vector which is in a superposition, not
the cat itself. ‘State vector’ and ‘cat’ are two concepts at different levels
of discourse.” However, we should also add that the distinction between a
mathematical level and a conceptual level happens of course in every phys-
ical theory. For example, ‘a point in phase space’ is not the same as ‘a
physical object is space-time’; but the relation between these two levels —
mathematical and conceptual— is articulated through classical mechanics
in such a way that there is in fact a direct relation between ‘a point in phase
space’ and ‘a physical object is space-time’. Indeed, every physical theory
—at least in representational realist terms (section 1)— has a mathematical
formalism which needs to be related to a conceptual network of physical con-
cepts. Every physical notion has a mathematical counterpart, the notion of
field, of wave, of particle, they all relate to a mathematical formalism and to
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specific equations that also constitute and constrain such physical notions.
In physics, as we stressed above, it is this interplay between mathemati-
cal formalisms and physical concepts which allow us to represent physical
experience and reality. And of course this involves a difficult relationship.
As Einstein8 [14, p. 1196] clearly made the point: “The problem is that
physics is a kind of metaphysics; physics describes ‘reality’. But we do not
know what ‘reality’ is. We know it only through physical description...” The
scope of this paper does not intend to discuss the difficult relation between
representation and reality, however we take for granted that a serious anal-
ysis should leave aside any type of “naive realism” which simply neglects
the fundamental relevance of representation within the definition itself of
phenomena (see for discussion [20]). But we should be also careful when
analyzing Dieks’ statement because the notion of ‘cat’ is a classical notion
which represents a classical entity9 and it should never be confused with ‘the
cat that is on my table hic et nunc while I write this paper’, for that would be
falling into the trap of naive realism; assuming that we have access to real-
ity as it is by confusing representation with reality. Physical notions —even
that of a ‘cat’— always pertain to physical discourse and representation, not
to reality as it is. Schro¨dinger designed his 1935 gedankenexperiment as an
ad absurdum proof which would make explicit how erroneous would be to
picture or interpret ‘quantum superpositions’ in terms of classical objects
(e.g., a cat). What Schro¨dinger exposed is that a quantum superposition (in
the mathematical level) cannot be represented in terms of a classical object
(in the conceptual level). Going against the second of Bohr’s desiderata
(section 2), we believe that the lesson provided by Schro¨dinger should be
regarded as an important road-sign that points in the direction of the need
of developing new physical concepts that coherently relate to the quantum
formalism.
Dieks himself explains very clearly one of the arguments in favor of the
existence of quantum superpositions:
“In classical physics the most fundamental description of a physical
system (a point in phase space) reflects only the actual, and noth-
ing that is merely possible. It is true that sometimes states involving
probabilities occur in classical physics: think of the probability distri-
8Against the interpretation of Einstein as a “naive” realist see [43].
9A classical entity such as for example a cat is constrained by the logical and ontological
principles of existence, non-contradiction and identity. Such principles constrain not only
the notion of physical object itself but also its relation to experience.
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butions ρ in statistical mechanics. But the occurrence of possibilities
in such cases merely reflects our ignorance about what is actual. The
statistical states do not correspond to features of the actual system
(unlike the case of the quantum mechanical superpositions), but quan-
tify our lack of knowledge of those actual features. This relates to the
essential point of difference between quantum mechanics and classical
mechanics that we have already noted: in quantum mechanics the pos-
sibilities contained in the superposition state may interfere with each
other. There is nothing comparable in classical physics. In statisti-
cal mechanics the possibilities contained in ρ evolve separately from
each other and do not have any mutual influence. Only one of these
possibilities corresponds to the actual situation. The above (putative)
argument for the reality of modalities can therefore not be repeated
for the case of classical physics.” [32, pp. 124-125]
Going against this interpretation, he provides several arguments against the
idea “that there is something real corresponding to each of these individual
terms”. Dieks starts his argumentation by stressing that the state Ψ is de-
fined as an element of a mathematical space. “It does therefore not make
immediate sense to speak about causal interactions between them: only
physical systems can causally affect each other, whereas numbers, functions
or mathematical entities in general, do not have causal effects.” This first
remark also applies of course to any physical theory. Mathematics with no
physical interpretation can be only understood as a formal scheme with no
relation whatsoever to the physical world (see for discussion [26]). But as a
matter of fact, going back to our earlier example, the evolution of ‘a point in
phase space’ in classical mechanics is in fact analyzed in terms of causality.
We agree with Dieks that one should be aware of the limits of the mathe-
matical and conceptual levels of discourse, however one cannot deny their
tight relation within physical theories. That is the whole point of calling
a mathematical equation an “evolution equation” or “equation of motion”.
From a realist perspective, we need to provide a physical interpretation of Ψ
in order to discuss about causality and physical states of affairs. Contrary to
what Dieks claims, this is not an argument against the idea that the terms of
a quantum superposition cannot be understood in terms of physical reality
but rather the very condition of possibility for such discussion and analysis.
As we have argued in the first section of this paper, realism attempts to
provide every physical theory with a representation of reality. That is what
realism is about.
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Dieks [Op. cit, p. 131] continues to argue that: “from a Humean view-
point it is clear from the outset that the states can only refer to actual
situations.”10 We consider this as a correct statement which only shows the
problems of empiricism to deal with quantum superpositions. We agree with
Dieks that the empiricist perspective has no need to provide a physical rep-
resentation of quantum superpositions, however, it has to deal instead with
two very deep problems. The first deals with the theory ladenness of phys-
ical observation, something that could be condensed in the famous dictum
that Einstein made to Heisenberg “It is only the theory which can tell you
what can be observed”. Physical observation always presupposes a physical
representation. Actual situations need to be described in terms of physical
theories, no matter how basic the situation is. As it is well known, the
20th century positivist project of distinguishing between theoretical terms
and empirical terms failed to provide an understanding of such distinction
which is necessary in order to argue in favor of the idea that empirical data
is not theory laden (see for discussion [20]). The second important point
is that from an empiricist perspective there would seem to be no problem
whatsoever with QM. For all we know, the theory is in fact empirically ad-
equate, so for an empiricist it seems that should be the end of the road.
There is no need for an empiricist to discuss the interpretation of the theory
in terms of a representation of physical reality. After all, that is a realist
project, not an empiricist one.
A third point made by Dieks is:
“[...] that there is no ground whatsoever to suppose that the plus-
sign in our superposition equations stands for simultaneous physical
existence [...] that Ψ = Ψ1 +Ψ2 means that in the situation described
by Ψ the situations described by Ψ1 and Ψ2 are physically present
as well. In fact, making this assumption would lead to a boundless
multiplication of realities, in view of the fact that Ψ can be written as
the sum of two other states in an uncountable infinity of ways.” [32,
pp. 124-125]
There are two elements in the argumentation made by Dieks. Firstly he
argues against the idea that “the plus-sign in our superposition equations
stands for simultaneous physical existence”. Let us provide a short analysis
which shows that there is indeed a physical basis which supports the idea
10Here actuality seems to be understood as a hic et nunc actual observation and not in
terms of a mode of existence.
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that the “+” sign relates to simultaneous physical existence. If we consider
a typical Stern-Gerlach type experiment in the x-direction we can have the
following quantum superposition: cx1| ↑x〉 + cx2| ↓x〉. There are two MPS
which relate to each one of the terms in this quantum superposition. Such
terms “evolve” and “interact” according to the Schro¨dinger equation of mo-
tion and can be predicted through the Born rule, but since the ignorance
interpretation is precluded, one cannot claim that all terms are actual simul-
taneously. However, this does not mean that all interpretations in terms of
simultaneous existence are precluded, it only means that —by definition of
actuality [23]— both terms cannot be considered as simultaneously actual.
Indeed, if we assume the metaphysical principle that ‘Actuality = Reality’
it seems difficult to come up with a different interpretation to that of MW.
Yet, this can be also understood as a limit imposed by the quantum formal-
ism to the representation of quantum reality in terms of actuality. This is a
constrain that leaves open the possibility to develop a non-classical physical
representation of reality. We know of no reasonable (non-dogmatic) argu-
ment against this possibility. The second element in the argumentation of
Dieks is the assumption that “Ψ can be written as the sum of two other
states in an uncountable infinity of ways [...] would lead to a boundless mul-
tiplication of realities”. First of all we must remark that Dieks now shifts
the question using the fact that Ψ can be represented in terms of different
bases. Contextuality enters the scene. Indeed, given our previous SG ex-
ample, changing the direction of the SG apparatus we can also obtain the
quantum superpositions related to the y-direction, cy1| ↑y〉+ cy2| ↓y〉, to the
z-direction, cz1| ↑z〉+cz2| ↓z〉, and to all possible directions that we can think
of. But the important point which supports the idea that each one of these
superpositions is related to physical reality is the fact that each one of these
superpositions gives rise through the Born rule to a definite set of MPS. This
does not seem a strange metaphysical move that multiplies reality beyond
necessity, but rather the very condition of empirical adequacy that any in-
terpretation of QM should meet. The numbers that accompany each one of
the terms of the different quantum superpositions directly relate (in square
modulus) to predictions about experimental outcomes —|cy1|
2 tells us the
ratio of finding a result related to | ↑y〉, |cy2|
2 tells us the ratio of finding a
result related to | ↓y〉, etc. Such terms “evolve” and “interact” according to
the Schro¨dinger equation of motion. So if every term “evolves”, “interacts”
and relates directly to physical experience, turning Dieks’ questioning up-
side down, why shouldn’t they be considered as necessary elements in the
definition of what the theory is talking about in terms of physical reality?
Dieks modal interpretation [28, 29, 30, 31] states the idea that given a
quantum state Ψ there is always a basis in which we can mathematically
represent Ψ as a superposition of one single term, |α〉. This of course is
not the most general way of mathematically representing Ψ, it is in fact the
only mathematical representation of Ψ in which the basis has been care-
fully chosen so that the number that accompanies the state is 1. In general,
Ψ will be represented by a superposition of more than one term,
∑
ci|βi〉.
Dieks continues to argue that the Ψ describes an ASA, namely, the prop-
erty given by |α〉〈α|. However, what Dieks interpretation fails to account
for is the physical meaning of all the other quantum superpositions —with
more than one term— that also give rise to MPS. To make our argument
more concrete, and going back to our SG example, given the fact that the
SG is placed in the z-direction and given the superposition is | ↑z〉, Dieks
modal interpretation claims that physical reality is (only) composed by the
property related to the projection operator | ↑z〉〈↑z |. Indeed, if we mea-
sure Ψ in the z-direction the Born rule predicts that we will obtain with
certainty the result related to this property because |1|2 = 1.11 However,
this interpretation is unable to provide an account of what really matters
for quantum technology, that is, all other superpositions
∑
cri |αri〉 (where
ri is a particular direction different to z and with cri 6= 0) that also seem to
be part of physical reality. These superpositions with more than one term
also provide definite information in terms of MPS about the (non-actual)
state of affairs (section 4). Consequently, the description provided by | ↑z〉
is —at least— incomplete. Furthermore, it implicitly changes the subject
of inquiry. When I ask, given a SG in the i-direction what is the meaning
of a quantum superposition given by: ci1| ↑i〉 + ci2| ↓i〉 (with ci1 6= 0 and
ci2 6= 0) which provides access to MPS in that specific physical situation,
it is not enough to answer —using the orthodox interpretation of quantum
superpositions discussed above— that, if I change the direction of the SG
to the j-direction (were I can write Ψ in terms of one single term |φj〉), I
will obtain with certainty the property related to the state |φj〉. This also
evades an answer to the MP (section 3). When I ask about observables re-
lated to | ↑i〉 and | ↓i〉—of which QM provides clear information that relates
to physical experience— the answer cannot be about a different observable
related to |φj〉. The interpretation of Dieks is not capable of providing an
answer to the question and thus also to the justification —in realist terms—
of present technological and experimental developments which explicitly use
11This is analogous to orthodox quantum logic interpretation.
21
Schro¨dinger cats. To put it in a different form, if given a Schro¨dinger cat I
ask the question: “Is the cat ‘dead’ or is it ‘alive’?” The answer cannot be:
“The cat is under the table”.
Since Dieks attempts to recover a description in terms of actualities, he
also argues against the reification of modalities:
“I think it is unclear how a realist interpretation of [a probability] p as
some kind of ontologically objective chance can help our understanding
of what is going on in nature. Clearly, such an interpretation cannot
change the empirical content and predictive power of the theory that
is involved. But also with regard to explanations nothing seems to
be gained by introducing ontologically real chance or real modalities,
because the notion of a real modality is in need of explanation itself.
For example, we do not really know what kind of things dispositions
are, and it is obscure exactly how a disposition could take care of the
task of arranging for the right relative frequencies to occur in long series
of experiments. Indeed, the very content of the notion of disposition
does not seem to go beyond “something responsible for the actual
relative frequencies found in experiments”.” [32, p. 133]
Here we also agree with Dieks that dispositions and propensity type inter-
pretations do not provide any type of addition to the understanding of QM.
But our criticism to such interpretations —which we have presented already
in [19]— stresses different aspects. Such type of interpretations do not ad-
vance truly in the development of a realm of reality independent of actuality
—respecting the classical dogma that: ‘Actuality = Reality’— and thus are
not able to explain what this new (non-actual) realm is about. Instead,
such interpretations define propensities, dispositions and even potentialities
as teleological notions in direct relation to actuality and actualization. A
‘propensity’, ‘dispositional’ or ‘potential’ property is one that can become
actual.12 We believe, contrary to Dieks, that the development of a mode of
existence independent of actuality which would match the formalism would
provide a new explanatory power in order to think about quantum experi-
ence in a radical non-classical manner. If we could think about QM beyond
measurement outcomes it is quite possible that we could also understand
what the theory is talking about and this, in turn, would also allow us to
imagine quantum experience beyond the algorithmic recipe that is being
12We have analyzed in detail such interpretations in [19, chapter 14].
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used today.
Griffiths also discusses the meaning of quantum superpositions trying to
“get rid of the ghost of Schro¨dinger’s cat”. His analysis founded on the CH
interpretation is very similar to that of Dieks modal interpretation, but in
some aspects he makes even more explicit the interpretational maneuvers.
Let us leave to Griffiths the explanation of his own approach:
“The CH strategy is to first identify the quantum properties, which
is to say the subspaces of the Hilbert space, that should enter the de-
scription. Here we are interested in a measurement with two possible
outcomes: either detector a has triggered or b has triggered. While
the individual states |Da∗〉 ⊗ |Db〉 and |Da〉 ⊗ |Db∗〉 can be inter-
preted as possible outcomes, their macroscopic superposition |Ψ3〉 in
(6) [|Ψ3〉 = α|D
a∗〉⊗ |Db+β|Da〉⊗ |Db∗〉] cannot, and indeed the pro-
jector [Ψ3] does not commute with any of the projectors [D
a∗], [Da],
[Db∗] or [Db]. (Our notation follows the usual physicists convention
that a projector P ⊗ I on a tensor product can be denoted by P .)
Consequently, if we demand that [Ψ3] be a physical property at time
t3, this choice of framework (i.e., [Ψ3] and I − [Ψ3]) will prevent us
from discussing the situation in Fig. 1 as a measurement, a physical
process with some specific macroscopic outcome. Instead we must use
a framework at time t3 that contains the projectors [D
a], [Da∗], [Db] or
[Db∗] and their products. Having made this choice CH employs |Ψ3〉
not as a physical property but as a pre-probability, a mathematical
device which can be used to calculate the probability of various prop-
erties via the usual Born formula: Pr(Da∗) = 〈Ψ3|D
a∗ ⊗ I|Ψ〉 = |α|2,
Pr(Db∗) = |β|2, Pr(Da∗, Db∗) = 0. (8) (Here Pr(A,B) is the proba-
bility of the conjunction A AND B.) In words, the probability is |α|2
that the a detector has triggered, |β|2 that the b detector has triggered,
and 0 that both have triggered. This way of understanding |Ψ3〉 is not
a new innovation, as it goes back to the work of Born in 1926.” [40]
As we see, Griffiths (like Dieks) distinguishes between superpositions which
are written as one single term and those which have more than one term
—using the equivalent class given by equation (6): |Ψ3〉 = α|D
a∗〉 ⊗ |Db +
β|Da〉 ⊗ |Db∗〉. As Griffiths makes the point:
“[...] in the CH discussion of measurement outcomes |Ψ3〉 is not re-
garded as a quantum property, but instead as a pre-probability, a
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mathematical device employed to calculate probabilities, and hence no
more “real” than a probability distribution of the sort one encounters
in classical statistical mechanics.” [40]
According to Griffiths, when making reference to a superposition of one term
one can say, via the Born rule, that the property is actually preexistent; but
when we want to claim something about α|Da∗〉 ⊗ |Db〉 + β|Da〉 ⊗ |Db∗〉
Griffiths oblige us to suddenly change the interpretation and think of such
superposition in terms of a “mathematical device employed to calculate
probabilities”. But this second interpretation introduced to account for the
most general superpositions of more than one term seems to us in no way
different to the explicit instrumentalist perspective assumed by Fuchs and
Peres when they argue that QM is “an algorithm for computing probabilities
for the macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of
experimental interventions” (section 1). In a very similar way to Dieks,
Griffiths provides a physical representation of only one of the many possible
representations of a given Ψ, namely, the one in which Ψ is written as one
single term. In such case Griffiths argues that “the property is preexistent”
while in the rest of mathematical representations superpositions are regarded
as “calculational tools” or algorithmic devices.13 The fact that probabilities
are used does not exempt the CH interpretation of providing a physical
meaning to such probability. As a matter of fact, in classical statistical
mechanics probability is a very well defined physical notion which describes
our ignorance about an ASA. But as Schro¨dinger remarked to Einstein many
years ago this is not the case in QM.14
“It seems to me that the concept of probability is terribly mishandled
these days. Probability surely has as its substance a statement as to
whether something is or is not the case —an uncertain statement, to be
sure. But nevertheless it has meaning only if one is indeed convinced
that the something in question quite definitely is or is not the case. A
probabilistic assertion presupposes the full reality of its subject.” [13,
p. 115]
13Griffiths also relates the failure to account for quantum superpositions in terms of
noncontextuality and the Single Framework Rule in [39]. A detailed analysis of this
argument is provided in [23].
14It is well known that QM has a non-Kolmogorovian probability measure which cannot
be interpreted in terms of ignorance about an ASA. See for example [46].
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6 The Ghost in the Lab
As we have argued above all the interpretations we have discussed seem to
remain in line with what we have called ‘the two Bohrian dogmas’ (section
2). None of these interpretations attempts to truly think beyond classicality
and its presupposed standpoint that ‘Actuality = Reality’. Instead, every
attempt that we know of —willingly or not— ends up trying to build a bridge
which can save our “classical” actualist understanding of physical reality.
And even those approaches which, from a realist standpoint, seem to agree
that there is nothing “classical” about QM, instead of developing a physical
representation of reality that would account for the quantum features in a
“positive” manner —as features that should be considered explicitly in order
to build up a non-classical representation of physical reality according to
the theory— end up only trying to justify ‘measurement outcomes’. Luckily
enough, quite independently of the discussions in the literature about the
MP and the BP which have constantly neglected the physical representation
and understanding of quantum superpositions, the work that is being done
today in the lab takes as a standpoint the existence of such strange elements
of the theory. Indeed, the technical and experimental developments that are
taking place today in quantum information processing use as a basic feature
of their developments the notion of quantum superposition [1, 5, 7, 41, 45, 51,
52]. Quantum computation, quantum teleportation, quantum cryptography,
etc., they all depend on their very existence. If superpositions —whatever
they are— did not exist, from a representational realist perspective, such
developments would not have been possible, it is that simple.
We agree with Griffiths [Op. cit., p. 174] when he argues against: “the
view that the real [quantum] world is classical, contrary to all we have
learned from the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth cen-
tury.” However, we must add to this remark that the fact that we can ‘do
things’ does not imply that we can ‘understand them’ or ‘represent them’.
This is the main difference, from a realist perspective, between physics and
technology, between realism and instrumentalism. Continuing our analysis,
on the one hand, quantum superpositions ‘evolve’ and ‘interact’ according
to the Schro¨dinger equation of motion (section 5.2), and on the other hand,
the outcomes that expose quantum superpositions can be empirically tested
through the Born rule. But when in physics a mathematical element of a
theory ‘evolves’, ‘interacts’ and can be predicted according to a formalism,
then —always from a representational realist perspective— that mathemat-
ical expression needs to be related (in some way) to physical reality.
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7 Taking Quantum Superpositions (Really) Seri-
ously
After more than one century of not being able to interpret QM in terms of
“classical reality”, it might be time to admit that QM confronts us with the
fact that classical representation of physics is not the end of the road. In this
respect a central argument for discussing a realist physical representation
of quantum superpositions has to do with the possibility of developing new
physical experience. Physical representation allows us to think, and even to
imagine new possible physical experiences when a mathematical formalism
is coherently supplemented by physical concepts. Physicists are trained
to think and imagine situations in terms of the different physical notions
which have been created in relation to particular physical theories: waves,
particles, fields, etc., allow us to physically represent reality; and it is exactly
this possibility, to think beyond measurement outcomes which truly opens
the door to new physical experience. This is one of the main reasons why
understanding quantum superpositions is so important, for they can become
the key to open the door of the quantum realm —a realm which still today
is not understood in coherent realist terms.
7.1 Quantum Superpositions and MPS
The quantum wave function Ψ gives rise to clear definite physical statements
regarding observables through the Born rule. The MPS provided by QM,
statements that have been used in order to develop experimental situations
and technological developments, are of the type:
Definition 7.1 MPS in QM: Given a vector in Hilbert space, Ψ, the Born
rule allows us to predict the average value of (any) observable O.
〈Ψ|O|Ψ〉 = 〈O〉
This prediction is independent of the choice of any particular basis.
This also means that given a Ψ, all observables are related to physical reality
through MPS independently of the basis. In short, there is no preferred basis
according to the formalism.
This definition of MPS in QM implies that according to the formalism all
observables —independently of the context— must be considered as part of
physical (quantum) reality simultaneously and independently of the choice
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of the context. This is of course —due to the contextual character of the
formalism (see for discussion [23])— not possible if we consider physical
reality only in terms of an ASA. This shows that, either the formalism
should be changed in order to recover a classical representation of reality
or, that we should leave aside our classical representation of physical reality,
that is, to consider the logical possibility that ‘Quantum Physical Reality 6=
Actuality’.
7.2 Quantum Superpositions as Contextual Existents
The first postulate of QM implies a “tricky” definition of what is to be
considered a quantum superposition. In any paper we find the following
equation defining a superposition of coherent states:
|ψ〉 = N (|a1〉+ |a2〉)
where N is a normalization factor. This definition is the seed of a deep
misunderstanding in the literature which we have analyzed in detail in [26].
The idea is that Ψ makes reference to something that can be considered
“the same” independently of the specific representation or context of in-
quiry. This allows to change the subject of discussion from a superposition
N (|a1〉+ |a2〉) of two terms, to a different superposition of only one term |ψ〉
—a very particular superposition that can be seemingly interpreted in terms
of the actual mode of existence. This interpretation denies the fact that even
though N (|a1〉+ |a2〉) and |ψ〉 are particular mathematical representations
of “the same” vector in Hilbert space, the equality sign which in strict math-
ematical terms means a class of equivalences, should not be confused —as
it is being done today— with a metaphysical identity.15 N (|a1〉 + |a2〉)
and |ψ〉 are two different representations of the same vector. To give an ex-
ample from classical physics, the fact that two different frames of reference
in classical mechanics can discuss about the movement of an object, does
not mean that the movement is “the same” from different perspectives. The
interesting thing to analyze in the equation N (|a1〉 + |a2〉) = |ψ〉 is not
what is “the same” but rather what is “different” about the two terms in
the equation. We should not concentrate so much in the equality sign but
in trying to understand in what sense N (|a1〉+ |a2〉) and |ψ〉 are different.
It is quite intuitive that each superposition relates to a specific exper-
imental set up, for each supereposition is a representation in terms of a
15For a discussion regarding this specific point we refer to [16, 17, 26].
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basis (or CSCO). Following this idea we have provided an interpretation of
quantum superpositions in terms of the notion of quantum situation through
which one recovers the contextual character of the theory in a natural way
[21]. Indeed the superposition would then make reference to the specific set
of observables considered within a definite set up. The Born rule provides
information through the coordinates in square modulus of the rate of definite
outcomes that relate to each term in the quantum superposition. Within
such physical interpretation it becomes clear that given a Ψ, each different
superposition will provide a definite set of MPS regarding each set of ob-
servables. The interpretation just exposed not only relates the formalism in
a more understandable way to the physical experience that is being done
today in the lab but also breaks down the orthodox claim that given a Ψ
all superpositions are “the same” superposition —a metaphysical claim that
is supported by Dieks’ and Griffits’ interpretations and analysis. Different
possibilities of this kind should be investigated.
7.3 ‘Contradictory’ and ‘Contrary’ Statements about Quan-
tum Superpositions
In [15], the author of this paper together with da Costa discussed the pos-
sibility to interpret quantum superpositions in terms of a paraconsistent
approach. Arenhart and Krause [2, 3, 4] provided arguments against such
Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS). Some of their
arguments where analyzed and criticized in [21, 24]. In this respect we also
call the attention to the ongoing debate regarding the interpretation of quan-
tum superpositions, taking into account the square of opposition, in terms
either of ‘contradictory statements’ or ‘contrary statements’. We believe
that this logical analysis of the formalism can be very useful in order to
come up with a coherent interpretation of superpositions.
7.4 ‘Measurement’ or ‘Superposition’ Problem?
Finally, we would like to make special emphasis on the fact that if we are
willing to truly investigate the physical representation of quantum superpo-
sitions then we will need to “invert” the MP, meaning that the attention
should be focused on the physical representation of the mathematical expres-
sion instead of attempting to somehow “save” the measurement outcomes.
In [19, 21] we argued in favor of the possibility of discussing what we call
the Superposition Problem (SP). This could be stated in terms of the neces-
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sity —given the new technological era we are witnessing through quantum
information processing— to provide a physical representation of quantum
superpositions, leaving aside the MP and its insistence in justifying classical
measurement outcomes.
Superposition Problem (SP): Given a situation in which there is a quan-
tum superposition of more than one term,
∑
ci |αi〉, and given the fact that
each one of the terms relates trough the Born rule to a MPS, the problem is
how do we physically represent this mathematical expression, and in partic-
ular, the multiple terms?
The SP opens the possibility to truly discuss a physical representation
of reality which goes beyond the classical representation of physics in terms
of an ASA. We are convinced that without such a replacement of the prob-
lems addressed in the literature there is no true possibility of discussing
an interpretation of QM which provides an objective non-classical physical
representation of reality. We know of no reasons to believe that this is not
doable.
Conclusion
Quite paradoxically, while experimentalist today are trying by all means to
keep Schro¨dinger cats alive in the lab, philosophers of physics have been
trying to kill these ghostly creatures in every interpretation of QM that we
know of. According to the arguments presented in this paper, quantum su-
perpositions force us, if we are wiling to take a representational realist stance
about physical theories, to a radical reconsideration of physical reality itself.
Since actuality seems not to be a mode of existence compatible with that of
QM, the equation ‘Actuality = Reality’ cannot continue guiding us in the
development of a physical representation of reality which matches the for-
malism of the theory. According to our analysis we should start to seriously
consider the possibility that ‘Quantum Physical Reality 6= Actuality’.
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